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s EGIONAL ECONOMIES ARE growing across the nation, lead-
ing some to observe that this shared national expansion 
differs considerably from the traditional seesaw of regional
downturns and upswings. However, this perception about
the past is based on the relatively recent experience of the
1980s and early 1990s, in which some regions contracted
while others expanded. Before then, regional economies tended to
move together. What contributed to this out-of-sync behavior? Does
the situation differ today?
A continuation of this pattern of regional disparities could have
significant implications for the national business cycle. Just as the 
nation is composed of regions, the national business cycle can be
thought of as the sum of regional business cycles. If parts of the 
nation expand while others contract, the nation as a whole may have
less severe recessions and less volatile business cycles. The current
U.S. expansion, along with the expansion of the 1980s, has been ex-
ceptionally long, far exceeding the four-year average for post–World
War II expansions. One contributor to this phenomenon may be 
diverging regional business cycles.
Many factors can cause regional business cycles to differ. For ex-
ample, national shocks may affect regions differently, due to differ-








An International Perspectivecapital. Regional cycles are also influ-
enced by shocks specific to the region,
such as droughts or regional regulatory
changes.
One particular explanation for di-
verging regional cycles gained promi-
nence in the 1980s—“rolling recessions.”
Analysts coined this term to describe a
phenomenon in which some industries
experienced downturns in reaction to
shocks, or changes in the national econ-
omy, while others continued to do well.
These rolling recessions may have led
to divergent regional cycles as regions
with varying output mixes reacted dif-
ferently to each industry downturn.
While industry downturns may have
influenced the regional economic differ-
ences of the 1980s and early 1990s,
other factors were also at work, such as
differences in taxes, local construction
cycles and labor costs. These factors
may become relatively more important
in future regional differences, as in-
creasingly similar regional output mixes
should lead to more similar responses
to industry shocks.
Business Cycles
There are two basic ways of looking
at the business cycle. The one underly-
ing most media discussion focuses on
absolute increases and decreases in eco-
nomic activity. For example, an increase
in many indicators, such as employment
and gross domestic product, over many
months is considered an expansion.
Conversely, a decline in these indicators
over many months is regarded as a con-
traction.
An alternative definition of the busi-
ness cycle, which this article uses, is
grounded not in terms of absolute 
increases and decreases in economic
activity but in terms of fluctuations
around a trend. When economists look
at economic indicators, they first ex-
clude the seasonal patterns, such as the
increase in holiday retail sales, to get a
more accurate picture of how the econ-
omy is doing relative to other times of
the year. When looking at business 
cycles, economists go a step further,
eliminating not only these short-term
changes but also the trends—changes
that occur over a long horizon, such as
a decade or more. For example, over a
long period, employment numbers will
trend upward with a growing popula-
tion. Elimination of both the short-term
ups and downs and the long-term
trends leaves the cyclical components,
which show where the economy is 
relative to where it would be if it grew
at a nice, steady pace over the years.
There are a number of ways to 
divide the nation for the purpose of
studying regional cycles, such as at the
state or census-region level. One inter-
esting approach is to look at regions
that form or encompass clusters of eco-
nomic activity, which was the basis for
how the country was divided when the
Federal Reserve districts were deline-
ated in 1913. One might expect to find,
within each area of concentrated eco-
nomic activity, a common business
cycle that could differ from that of 
another location. Although the econ-
omy has evolved since 1913, this divi-
sion seems reasonable for an analysis of
regional business cycles.
Do Regional Cycles Just Reflect
National Industry Cycles?
As already noted, one can think of
the business cycle in terms of fluctua-
tions in economic activity around the
trend. At the national level, economists
typically focus on such indicators of
economic activity as gross domestic
product or the unemployment rate. At
the state or Federal Reserve district
level, a narrower range of indicators is
available, such as personal income and
employment.
The cyclical components of personal
income in the 12 Federal Reserve dis-
tricts are shown in Chart 1. The picture
reveals that the cyclical components of
personal income tend to move together,
increasing and decreasing at about the
same time, although not perfectly and
not at all times. To the extent the cycles
are similar, this suggests that regional
cycles are responses to changes in the
national economy, rather than region-
specific changes. As can be seen in
Chart 1, the degree of correlation of
economic activity among the 12 Federal
Reserve districts was strongest for the
cycle associated with the run-up to the
oil price shock of 1974.
During the 1980s, however, there
were signs that the districts’ cycles were
becoming less synchronized, to a de-
gree not seen in earlier postwar
decades. While there were a few years
before the 1980s in which some regions
diverged, the disparities were not as
pronounced or as frequent. Chart 2
shows the same pattern for employ-
ment. It is difficult to say how close the
regional cycles are today. While regions
across the country are growing in terms
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Bostonof absolute measures, they may still dif-
fer in terms of movement around their
trends. Unfortunately, the econometric
techniques used to obtain cyclical com-
ponents do not allow reliable estimates
for more recent years.
The divergence in regional cycles in
the 1980s may have been caused by a
series of changes in the national econ-
omy that had varying effects on regions
due to their differing regional output
mixes. This is consistent with the notion
of rolling recessions—different indus-
tries experiencing downturns at differ-
ent times—that permeated U.S. policy
discussions in the 1980s. For example, a
manufacturing downturn hit the Mid-
west in the early 1980s. Then the oil
price drop of 1986 hurt the oil patch,
and defense cuts stung California and
New England in the early 1990s. In 
addition, these downturns caused some
migration of workers, which in turn
helped fuel other regions’ expansions,
such as those of Texas and California in
the early 1980s.
Studies of rolling recessions’ effect
on regional economies in the 1980s
centered on absolute increases or de-
creases in regional indicators such as
employment, gross state product or 
personal income. However, looking at
fluctuations around the trend, the same
patterns appear. In 1985, personal in-
come in the Midwestern districts de-
creased toward their trends with the
decline of the manufacturing sector,
while personal income in the Dallas
and Kansas City districts continued to
increase. This decline in certain national
manufacturing industries affected the
Midwest to a greater extent because 
of the region’s larger concentration of
these industries.
The following year, the oil industry
plummeted with the oil price shock 
of 1986. Oil price changes, although 
national shocks, affect the cycles of 
energy-producing and energy-consuming
regions differently. In 1986, when oil
prices dropped by half, Texas’ personal
income plunged below trend. But while
the oil price drop had a large negative
impact on the Texas economy, it
spurred growth in other parts of the
country, such as New England, as en-
ergy costs fell (Chart 3).
A few years later, cuts in national 
defense spending caused the defense
industry to decline. This national shock
was clearly a source of weakness for
New England and some other areas of
the country, such as California. Dallas
Fed economist Lori Taylor studied em-
ployment sensitivity to defense spend-
ing by state, based on each state’s
industrial mix and each industry’s sensi-
tivity to defense spending.
1 She found
that Connecticut was the most defense-
sensitive state because of its high con-
centration of transportation equipment
manufacturing, particularly shipbuilding.
For example, as Chart 4 shows, trans-
portation equipment manufacturing fell
much further than the national average
in states with a high concentration of
defense-related transportation manufac-
turing, such as Connecticut and Cali-
fornia. In addition to Connecticut, other
New England states had above-average
sensitivities, due in part to high concen-
trations of electronics manufacturing.
If these rolling recessions were to
recur, the regional responses might be
less disparate since there is evidence
that over the decades regions have be-
come more similar in terms of industry
mix.
2 For example, Dallas Fed econ-
omists Steve Brown and Mine Yücel
found that because state economies are
becoming more similar in their compo-
sition, the variation across states in the
response to changing oil prices is nar-
rowing.
3 However, industry mix does
not seem to be the only determinant of
regional response to an industry down-
turn. The industry shocks that occurred
before the 1980s, such as the oil price
changes and defense cuts of the 1970s,
were not accompanied by widely vary-
ing regional responses, in spite of a
greater degree of regional industry con-
centration. The cause of this increased
responsiveness to industry shocks in the
1980s is still unknown.
4
Other Regional Influences
The series of national shocks to 
the manufacturing, energy and defense 
industries is clearly reflected in move-
ments in Federal Reserve districts’ per-
sonal income and employment. Regions
responded differently to these shocks
because they had differing degrees of
dependence on these industries. How-
ever, other region-specific factors also
influence regional cycles.
For example, a change in federal tax
laws affects states differently, depending
on state tax structure. States may choose
from a variety of levies to raise revenue,
such as sales, income, property and busi-
ness taxes. Since some of these taxes
are not deductible against federal in-
come taxes, sensitivity to changes in
federal income taxes will depend on 
the state tax structure. In addition, these
differences in taxes, or in government
services and quality of life, can lead 
to various combinations of labor and
capital across regions. Differing capital–
labor mixes in turn contribute to vary-
ing regional responses to national
shocks, such as changes in minimum
wage laws or capital gains taxation.
5
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United States Connecticut CaliforniaThe construction sector, although in-
fluenced by national factors such as 
interest rate and tax law changes, also
responds to local characteristics. For 
instance, changes in a region’s industry
mix or demographic characteristics may
trigger a change in construction activity.
This response to local characteristics
may lead construction activity to diverge
from economic activity that is more de-
pendent on national demand. For ex-
ample, in the 1980s, both New England
and Texas experienced construction
booms as other parts of their economies
slowed. Although oil prices fell in 1982
and the Texas economy slowed, Texas
construction activity surged throughout
the mid-1980s. This boom was due in
part to Texas banking institutions’ in-
creased interest in real estate invest-
ments following losses in energy-related
lending and Texas thrifts’ ability to fund
commercial construction projects fol-
lowing deregulation. Similarly, in the
mid-1980s, New England construction
thrived, largely because of strong de-
mand from locally oriented industries,




This out-of-sync behavior within the
Texas and New England economies led
Dallas Fed economists to study the in-
fluences of the construction sector, oil
prices and the national business cycle
on the Texas business cycle of the late
1970s and 1980s.
7 They found that
while the U.S. economy and oil prices
had the largest effect, the construction
sector also had a significant impact.
Another example of region-specific
influences can be found in New Eng-
land’s late-1980s downturn. Although
defense cuts and nationally declining
manufacturing industries certainly con-
tributed to the downturn, a loss of 
market share to competitors in other 
regions was also to blame. Edward
Moskovitch, in a Boston Fed article, re-
ported that a wide range of durable
goods industries lost market share in
the mid-1980s.
8 Moskovitch cited the
high cost of doing business in the re-
gion, compared with other regions, as
the reason for the decline across so
many New England industries. Thus,
New England’s downturn was fed by
local characteristics as well as national
influences.
However, regional factors that greatly
influenced regional economies in the
past may not be as important in the 
future. Some of these regional charac-
teristics may be changing, possibly be-
coming more alike across regions, as
lower transportation costs, better com-
munications options, and access to 
national and international capital mar-
kets allow firms to locate in places not
previously considered. On the other
hand, this may just mean that other
characteristics, such as local taxes or
quality of life, will become more impor-
tant influences on business formation.
Conclusion
The concept of the rolling recession
emerged in the 1980s in response to
shocks in the economy that affected
some industries more than others. By
extension, the downturns in these in-
dustries, in combination with other eco-
nomic influences, affected some regions
more than others, causing some areas
of the country to experience slowing of
their economies while others saw their
economies expand. Whether the diver-
gence of the 1980s represents just a
temporary phenomenon unlikely to be
repeated or a fundamental change in the
characteristics of the national economy
cannot be determined without further
study and a longer period of observa-
tion. Therefore, it is too soon to tell if the
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s
Implications for the Economic and Monetary Union
Business cycles at the Federal Reserve district level may shed light on what Europeans
can expect under the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), scheduled to go into effect
January 1, 1999.
1 In discussions of EMU’s likely implications for Europe, the United States
is often cited as an example of an enduring monetary union, while the U.S. central bank,
the Federal Reserve, is cited as a model of how a central bank would function in a mone-
tary union. Thus, at least in principle, the business-cycle experience of the U.S. regions
holds useful lessons for what Europe can expect under EMU.
Dallas Fed economists Mark Wynne and Jahyeong Koo found a greater similarity among
Federal Reserve district business cycles than among those of prospective EMU members.
Insofar as the United States can be a model of what might occur in Europe with a credible
monetary union, these patterns suggest the possibility of greater synchronization of busi-
ness cycles across EMU countries than has been the case in the past. However, important
differences remain between the Federal Reserve System and EMU, such as the degree to
which each region or EMU country can influence economic policy. Policy differences, such
as those that affect the cost of doing business, influence economic activity within the United
States. The policy differences between the EMU countries are likely to be even more 
important than those of regions with much less autonomy.
1 Mark A. Wynne and Jahyeong Koo, “Business Cycles Under Monetary Union: EU and U.S. Business
Cycles Compared,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper no. 7, 1997.OHN MAYNARD KEYNES once
stated that policymakers are
“usually the slaves of some 
defunct economist.” Well, accord-
ing to a wide range of commen-
tators, recently it’s been Keynes
himself who has held policymakers en-
thralled.
1 These commentators complain
that the Fed has tried to “fine-tune” real
activity—and that, in doing so, the Fed
has imposed an artificial speed limit on
the economy and kept the unemploy-
ment rate unnecessarily high. More
specifically, Federal Reserve officials are
accused of having relied too heavily on
an analytical tool called the Phillips
curve when deciding whether to raise
the federal funds rate.
This article provides some historical
perspective on the critics’ complaints
and evaluates the merits of their argu-
ments. I argue that Fed policymakers
would deserve censure if they behaved
as the critics claim. However, the critics’
accusations are largely without merit,
and their own policy prescriptions are
flawed.
Current Rates of Output Growth 
Are Not Sustainable
Over the past three years (1994:1–
97:1), real GDP has grown at a 2.9 
percent average annual rate. Over the
past four quarters (1996:1–97:1), it has
grown at a whopping 4 percent annual
rate. The idea that growth at these rates
can continue indefinitely is appealing
but unrealistic. Chart 1 shows the rela-
tionship between real GDP growth and
the change in the unemployment rate
since the mid-1980s. For example, the
point plotted in the extreme lower
right-hand corner shows that real GDP
rose by 7 percent in 1984, while the un-
employment rate fell by 2 percentage
points. More generally, the chart shows
that the unemployment rate has tended
to fall whenever GDP growth has much
exceeded 2 percent. Indeed, the unem-
ployment rate has declined in fully nine
of ten years in which growth has ex-
ceeded 2 percent (the exception being
1992). In two of three years in which
growth has fallen short of 2 percent, the
unemployment rate has risen. In the 
exceptional year (1995), GDP growth
fell below 2 percent by only 1 one-
hundredth of a percentage point.
The implication is that GDP growth
at recent rates must eventually drive 
unemployment to zero, unless produc-
tivity or the labor force begins to in-
crease at a substantially faster clip than
we have seen so far during this ex-
pansion.
2 Something is going to have to
give, and that something is likely to be
the growth rate of real GDP.
This conclusion leaves open the pos-
sibility that noninflationary growth of
2.5 percent or more is feasible over the
next year or two. It’s on the issue of
whether strong growth can be sustained
for another few years that reasonable
people may disagree, depending on
their beliefs about the nature of the
short-term output–inflation trade-off.
The Phillips Curve
The downward sloping line shown
in Chart 2, fitted to U.S. unemployment
and inflation data from the 1960s, is
called a Phillips curve. The Phillips
curve is named after New Zealand-born
economist Alban W. Phillips, who used
British data to demonstrate that wage
inflation tends to be high when the 
unemployment rate is low. Phillips’ 
rationalization of this relationship was
simple: the price of a good increases
when the good is in high demand. Low
unemployment rates are a symptom of
high demand for labor, so low un-
employment rates are associated with
rapid increases in the price of labor.
Economists often plot Phillips curves
using product price inflation in place of
wage inflation, because the two types
of inflation tend to move together.
From 1958, when Phillips originally
published his research, through the end
of the 1960s, many economists believed
that policymakers could choose any
point along the Phillips curve and hold
the economy there indefinitely. How-
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two components, which I will discuss 
in turn.
Lesson 1: Changes in Inflation
Expectations Shift the Phillips Curve
First, events of the 1970s increased
appreciation for the importance of infla-
tion expectations.
3 Milton Friedman and
Edmund Phelps led the charge, arguing
that monetary policy is like a drug for
which the economy can build up a 
tolerance: larger and larger doses are 
required to achieve a given effect. Ini-
tially, an acceleration in money growth
puts more real purchasing power in
people’s pockets. Increased sales mean
more jobs, and unemployment falls.
Consequently, the economy follows a
path that looks a lot like the Phillips
curve of the 1960s. However, as the
rapid money growth continues, the
economy begins to adapt to it. Eventu-
ally, wages and prices catch up to the
money supply, and the stimulus to out-
put and employment fades away. Only
higher inflation remains. In Chart 3 (an
updated version of Chart 2) we see a
move to the right as we follow the
economy from 1970 to 1971 and 1972.
At first, Nixon’s wage and price controls
kept inflation down to 4 percent, but in
1973 inflation broke loose and a new
round of stimulus began. By 1974 in-
flation was above 10 percent. Over 
the next 10 years—from 1974 through
1983—the economy stayed on a new,
higher Phillips curve, representing a
less favorable short-run trade-off be-
tween unemployment and inflation.
The reason for the shift in the
Phillips curve was an increase in infla-
tion expectations. In the 1960s, people
thought that inflation would eventually
stabilize at an annual rate of about 
2 percent. From the mid-1970s to the
mid-1980s, they acted as if inflation
would eventually stabilize at an 8 or 9
percent annual rate. The increase in 
inflation expectations stemmed from
policymakers’ attempts to keep the un-
employment rate artificially low.
The lowest unemployment rate that
is consistent, over the long term, with
stable inflation is called the nonacceler-
ating inflation rate of unemployment, or
NAIRU. A typical NAIRU estimate is 6
percent. At unemployment rates below
the NAIRU, there is a tendency for in-
flation expectations to rise. (Such was
the experience of the early 1970s.) At
unemployment rates above the NAIRU,
there is a tendency for inflation expec-
tations to fall.
4
Unfortunately, you can’t look up the
value of the NAIRU in an encyclopedia,
and it’s not published in the Wall Street
Journal. The NAIRU has to be esti-
mated. A big part of the debate be-
tween those who believe that the
Phillips curve remains a useful guide 
to policy and those who do not has to
do with how good a handle we have 
on the NAIRU at any given moment.
5
That brings us to the second important
lesson that economists learned during
the 1970s.
Lesson 2: The NAIRU Varies
Over Time—Not Always Predictably
The sharp oil price increases of the
1970s made it obvious to everyone that
supply-side shocks can temporarily
change the NAIRU and have an im-
portant impact on inflation. A supply
shock is any disturbance that alters 
the amount of output that can be pro-
duced from given quantities of land,
machinery and human effort. Supply-
side shocks are also sometimes called
productivity shocks. Aside from oil-price
increases, the supply shocks that have
received the most attention from macro-
economists are probably crop failures
because of drought or flooding.
Just how important are supply shocks?
That’s the $64,000 question. Keynesians
tend to view such shocks as infrequent
and easily accounted for. It’s this belief
that drives their policy prescriptions.
For if supply shocks don’t shift the
NAIRU around too much, so that its
value can be pinned down, then the 
appropriate policy is obvious: get the
unemployment rate to the NAIRU and
keep it there. As a practical matter, the
Keynesian prescription is for an unem-
ployment rate of about 6 percent and
GDP growth of about 2 percent.
Unfortunately for the Keynesians,
more and more analysts are coming
around to the view that supply-side
shocks are so pervasive as to seriously
limit the usefulness of the NAIRU as a
policy guide. Even after accounting for
food and energy shocks, NAIRU esti-
mates vary substantially from year to
year. Moreover, in any given year, the
exact value of the NAIRU is not known
with any confidence. Recent estimates
suggest that the NAIRU is probably
around 6 percent but could easily be as
low as 4.5 percent or as high as 7.5 per-
cent (Staiger, Stock and Watson 1997).
Increasingly, analysts regard the NAIRU
estimate  du jour as a yellow caution
sign rather than a red stoplight.
Has the Fed Been a Slave to the
Keynesian View of the Phillips Curve?
If, as its critics assert, the Fed has
been trying to hold the unemployment
rate above some preconceived NAIRU,
then it has bungled the job. As shown
in Chart 4, the unemployment rate has
fallen, more or less steadily, from a high
of 7.7 percent in June 1992 to a low of
4.8 percent in July 1997. The unem-
ployment rate was last above 6 percent
three years ago (in July 1994) despite
the fact that, for most of this period, 
6 percent was the generally accepted
estimate of the NAIRU. Clearly, the Fed
Chart 3
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At most, the Fed has been occasionally
tapping the brakes to slow the unem-
ployment rate’s descent.
It’s revealing to look at the unem-
ployment rate in combination with the
inflation rate, rather than in isolation. 
As Chart 5 clearly shows, the short-run
Phillips curve shifted down a notch 
during the mid-1980s in response to the
persistently tough anti-inflation stance
of the Volker Fed. Then, over the 10-
year period from 1985 through 1994,
unemployment and inflation varied
pretty much as though people believed
that inflation would eventually stabilize
at around 4 percent. Since 1993, despite
a falling unemployment rate, inflation
has held steady. (Look at the points
marked as stars.) It’s beginning to look
as though the Phillips curve has shifted
yet again and that we’re back in the
1960s, with expected inflation down
around 2 percent. The challenge for
policymakers is to ensure that we don’t
replay the entire 1960s inflation experi-
ence.
Why Has Inflation Been So Tame?
Three factors have contributed to the
economy’s strong inflation performance
in recent years. First, we’ve benefited
from a series of favorable supply shocks.
These shocks have included innova-
tions in health-care management that
have held down medical cost inflation;
the spread of cheaper, increasingly
powerful computers and telecommuni-
cations devices; and increased competi-
tion because of deregulation and freer
global trade. Second, a more uncertain
and more flexible labor market may
mean that the unemployment rate has
become less useful as a measure of
slack in the economy.
6 Finally, the Fed-
eral Reserve has conducted policy in a
way that has convinced people that it is
serious about preventing any significant
resurgence of inflation.
How has Fed policy accomplished
this task? Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
may have revealed the answer recently
in a speech defending March’s quarter-
point hike in the federal funds rate.
Greenspan said that “persisting—indeed
increasing—strength in nominal de-
mand for goods and services suggested
to us that monetary policy might not be
positioned appropriately to avoid a
buildup in inflation pressures” (CitiCorp
1997). Note that Greenspan’s statement
focuses on the strength of the nominal
demand for goods and services, not the
real demand.
As shown in Chart 6, Federal Reserve
policies have kept the level of nominal
spending on a fairly steady 5 percent
growth track over the past six years.
Modest, steady spending growth is an
attractive strategy to pursue in the face
of uncertainty about the output–infla-
tion trade-off. It is a strategy especially
popular among economists trained in
the monetarist tradition.
What’s so great about a policy of
steady spending growth? Since spend-
ing growth is the sum of real growth
and inflation, a policy of steady spend-
ing growth does not preclude strong
real growth, provided strong real growth
is accompanied by low inflation. Turn-
ing this statement around, there is little
danger that inflation will substantially
accelerate under a policy of steady
spending growth, for inflation can rise
only to the extent that the economy’s
capacity for real growth falls.
7
Survey results indicate that Federal
Reserve policies during the 1990s have
resulted in a gradual reduction in long-
term inflation expectations. This reduc-
tion in expectations has undoubtedly
contributed to the benign behavior of
actual inflation in recent years.
Why Not Target Inflation Directly?
Many of the analysts who have been
critical of the Fed seem to feel that 
the hallmark of a successful monetary
policy is not stable output growth (the
Keynesian view) and not low and stable
spending growth (the monetarist view)
but a stable inflation rate.
8 These com-
mentators apparently believe that the
Fed should allow output and employ-
ment to fluctuate arbitrarily, as long as
inflation remains constant.
One problem with this approach is
that inflation bounces around so much
that a change in trend is often not 
apparent for six months to a year after
it has begun.
Another problem is that the lags be-
tween the Fed’s policy actions and their
Chart 4
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Chart 6
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Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  7effects on inflation are considerable—
most estimates put them at a year or
more. When you add the time it takes
for policy to change inflation to the time
it takes to recognize that a change in
policy is needed, trying to target the in-
flation rate is a little like trying to drive
down a highway at 60 miles per hour in
heavy fog, and—just to make things in-
teresting—there’s a five-second delay
between when you apply the brakes
and when the brakes are activated.
It’s easy to call for inflation-rate tar-
geting in a period when constant infla-
tion is consistent with a booming
economy. One has to wonder whether
advocates of inflation-rate targeting will
be equally vocal the next time we’re hit
with a major drought or a run-up in the
price of oil, when holding inflation con-
stant might require a recession.
The Fed and Its Critics
In summary, some commentators have
accused the Federal Reserve of pursu-
ing a Keynesian strategy. They claim
that, in a mistaken effort to fine-tune
real economic activity, the Fed has sti-
fled output and employment gains that
have their origins on the supply side.
The critics advocate an alternative
policy—one that would allow output
and employment to range freely, as
long as inflation holds steady. Since
they believe that supply-side shocks
make the Phillips curve all but useless
as a policy tool, the critics say the Fed
should look to indicators of inflation ex-
pectations and to sensitive commodity
prices for signs that inflation is about to
accelerate.
In fact, the Fed has pursued a middle
course. It has taken an eclectic ap-
proach to evaluating strain in the labor
and product markets, neither rigidly en-
forcing a speed limit on real GDP
growth nor panicking as the unemploy-
ment rate has fallen below 6 percent. It
has allowed positive supply shocks to
be reflected in higher output and em-




1 See, for example, Galbraith (1997) and Yardeni (1997a,b).
2 For an elaboration of this argument, see Krugman (1996).
3 The analysis that follows is developed more fully in Koenig and
Wynne (1994).
4 Just how quickly inflation expectations adjust and what information
they respond to remain the subject of debate. In empirical work, most
economists assume that expected inflation is just a weighted average
of past actual inflation rates. Historically, this approximation does
well, but in macroeconometrics, as in personal investing, “past per-
formance is no guarantee of future results.” The success of the 
standard approach may simply reflect the fact that to date we have
seen no policy regime changes important enough to have had a
major impact on Fed credibility.
5 For a defense of the Phillips curve as a policy guide, see Meyer
(1997a,b).
6 For an elaboration, see Duca (1997) and Meyer (1997a).
7 Thus, a policy of stabilizing nominal spending is a compromise 
between an output-stabilization policy and a price-level or inflation-
stabilization policy. See Koenig (1995).
8 Analysts expressing such views include Yardeni (1997a,b) and 
Kudlow (1997).
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Page  8 Southwest Economy   September/October 1997 HE DRAMATIC DIFFERENCES
across countries in how firms
are financed and how their
managers are held accountable
to shareholders have long been
the subject of intense academic
scrutiny. Only recently, however, have
these issues become a hot policy topic.
In the United States, there is ongoing
debate about the best methods of 
financing and governing firms. In Japan
and Germany, corporate finance mar-
kets have been substantially deregu-
lated in recent years. Other countries,
such as France and Italy, are consider-
ing vast privatization efforts and corre-
sponding changes in their financial
systems. And the formerly communist
countries are putting in place entirely
new systems of property rights, busi-
ness law and financial markets.
In deciding how to fashion their 
financial markets, policymakers must
determine the optimal way to organize
their corporate sectors. In doing so,
they clearly would benefit from under-
standing the factors behind the differ-
ent corporate finance and governance
systems in the major industrialized
countries.
Even the casual observer can see 
significant differences in how firms are
financed and governed in the major 
industrialized countries. For example,
U.S. firms rely heavily on corporate 
securities markets to finance invest-
ment, whereas for Japanese and Ger-
man firms, intermediaries—principally
banks—have traditionally been the
most important source of external 
finance. This is illustrated by the rela-
tively small amounts of money raised in
the Japanese and German stock markets
(Chart 1) and the much higher share of
external finance that comes from banks
(Table 1) in Japan and Germany.
The three countries also exhibit big
differences in the primary mechanisms
of corporate governance. One impor-
tant mechanism is high ownership con-
centration. If a firm’s ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of a few in-
vestors, each will have sufficient incen-
tive to invest in acquiring information
and monitoring management. Large
shareholdings also confer the ability 
to exert control over management,
through either voting power or board
representation, or both. A second im-
portant mechanism is the credible threat
of a hostile takeover, which can moti-
vate managers to act in shareholders’
best interests.
One of the starkest differences be-
tween the United States and Germany
and Japan is the frequency of such hos-
tile takeovers. Since World War II, for
example, only four successful hostile
takeovers have occurred in Germany.
They’re almost as rare in Japan. Con-
versely, in the United States, more than
10 percent of the 1980 Fortune 500 have
since been acquired in a transaction
that was hostile or started off that way.
Obviously, the threat of a hostile
takeover is a more important compo-
nent of the corporate governance
mechanism in the United States than it
is in Germany or Japan.
In contrast, firms in Japan and (espe-
cially) Germany exhibit much higher
degrees of ownership concentration
than does the United States. Ownership
is very heavily concentrated in German
firms. The five largest shareholders of a
firm own, on average, close to 50 per-
cent of the firm’s outstanding equity,
compared with around 33 percent 
in Japan and about 25 percent in 
the United States (Chart 2). These large
shareholders in Japanese and German
firms are primarily banks, other finan-
cial institutions such as life insurance
companies, and nonfinancial corpora-
tions. Together they hold about 70 
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Public Equity as a 









Germany Japan United States
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Securities Markets
in Japan, 1996; Monthly Report of the
Deutsche Bundesbank.
Table 1
Composition of Companies’ Credit Market Debt as a Percentage of
Total Credit Market Debt, 1995
United States Germany Japan
Total intermediated debt 54 74 77
Intermediated debt from banks 17 66 60
Securities 46 26 23
NOTE: Credit market debt excludes trade debt. Intermediated debt refers to loans from financial intermediaries.
Securities include commercial paper, other short-term bills and long-term bonds.
SOURCE: OECD Financial Statistics, Part III.percent of the outstanding shares of
German and Japanese firms, in contrast
to the United States, where, despite the
fast growth of mutual fund holdings 
in recent years, direct individual hold-
ings remain relatively more important
(Table  2).
These differences in finance and
governance are not simply accidents 
of history but a result of major differ-
ences in the legal and regulatory en-
vironments of the countries’ financial
systems. The differences are essentially 
of two kinds. First is the degree to
which firms are restricted from utiliz-
ing nonbank financing. In contrast to
the United States, Germany and Japan
have traditionally discriminated heavily
against the development of corporate
securities markets. The restrictions have
revolved largely around stiff securities
transaction taxes and cumbersome
issue-authorization procedures that are
required for security offerings. Com-
bined, they have imposed a heavy bur-
den on firms seeking nonbank finance,
domestically or abroad.
Second are differences in the legal
and regulatory restraints on large in-
vestors being “active” in firms. U.S. laws
are generally much more hostile to in-
vestors taking large, influential equity
stakes in firms and actively monitoring
management. These laws—which in-
clude Glass–Steagall restrictions on
banks’ holding of corporate equity,
portfolio regulation of other financial
institutions, and tax, insider trading and
corporate bankruptcy laws—have led
to relatively dispersed holdings of 
equity in the United States. The absence
of such restrictions in Japan and 
Germany has encouraged the higher
levels of ownership concentration in
these countries.
Of course, as a financial system’s
legal and regulatory environment
changes, so may methods of corporate
finance and governance. Both Japan
and Germany have lifted many of the
more onerous restrictions on their 
corporate securities markets in the past
15 years. This is already reducing their
firms’ dependence on bank lending. 
In the United States, there has been
some relaxation of the numerous re-
strictions on financial and nonfinancial
corporations taking large equity stakes
in other firms.
Clearly, there is some long-term 
convergence of the legal and regulatory
environments of these countries. How-
ever, this convergence is not toward the
German, Japanese or U.S. system as
they now exist but to an environment in
which financial institutions and other
investors are free to take large equity
stakes in firms and in which corporate
capital markets are unhindered by reg-
ulatory and legal obstacles.
Speculating about the primary mech-
anisms of corporate financing and con-
trol in such a system is interesting,
given that these conditions don’t cur-
rently exist in any industrialized coun-
try. The closest approximation to this
emerging model may be the United
States in the early 20th century, before
the passage of Glass–Steagall.
In addition, there is no guarantee
that a convergence of the three coun-
tries’ regulatory environments will mean
a convergence in their methods of cor-
porate financing and governance, if in-
stitutional history has any influence on
the financial system’s structure. For this
reason, differences in methods of cor-
porate financing and governance may
persist long after differences in the legal
and regulatory environments have dis-
appeared.
—Stephen D. Prowse
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Table 2
Percentage of Outstanding Corporate Equity Held by Various
Sectors in the United States, Germany and Japan, 1995
United States Germany Japan
Financial institutions 44.5 30.3 35.8
Banks .2 10.3 13.3
Other financial institutions 44.3 20.0 22.5
Nonfinancial firms 15.0 42.1 31.2
Individuals 36.3 14.6 22.4
Foreign 4.2 8.7 10.1
Government 0 4.3 .5
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SOURCE: Stephen D. Prowse, “The Structure of
Corporate Ownership in Germany,” working
paper, 1997.Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet Web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
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FTER MORE THAN a decade of growth, the Texas
economy shows few signs of faltering. Federal Reserve
Bank estimates indicate that gross state product ex-
panded at a brisk 4.3 percent annual rate in the first
quarter. Although employment growth appears to
have slowed recently, private nonfarm employment in
Texas has grown at a 2.9 percent annual rate since the start of
the year. The employment growth is broad based, with only a
few noteworthy exceptions—apparel (manufacturing and re-
tailing), chemicals, and computer-related manufacturing.
Despite recent declines in oil prices, employment is up
sharply in oil and gas extraction and oil field machinery. The
industry press reports shortages of skilled workers and a 12-
to 18-month backlog for drill pipe.
Residential construction seems to be heating up again,
which is partially offsetting a cooling in nonresidential con-
A
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
7/97 122.3 126.6 165.2 456.1 1,074.6 1,471.3 5,368.7 8,535.9 1,829.2 707.3
6/97 121.0 126.9 164.5 457.5 1,073.8 1,470.8 5,357.2 8,523.8 1,828.9 705.8
5/97 121.4 125.9 163.4 456.6 1,073.1 1,475.6 5,347.3 8,516.0 1,827.0 705.4
4/97 120.2 124.7 163.1 450.9 1,072.2 1,474.4 5,328.9 8,489.5 1,828.5 703.4
3/97 119.1 124.6 162.5 448.7 1,068.6 1,472.3 5,313.9 8,466.0 1,824.1 702.1
2/97 119.4 124.1 162.7 446.5 1,068.7 1,470.2 5,296.2 8,444.3 1,821.9 701.6
1/97 118.9 124.3 160.7 437.0 1,064.3 1,467.0 5,276.2 8,405.2 1,820.3 699.8
12/96 117.7 124.0 159.4 443.9 1,065.9 1,465.7 5,279.7 8,414.6 1,819.4 698.5
11/96 118.7 123.8 158.7 445.4 1,065.1 1,460.7 5,271.3 8,401.2 1,818.7 697.0
10/96 117.6 123.3 157.9 442.1 1,061.4 1,455.9 5,237.6 8,354.9 1,816.0 696.2
9/96 117.1 123.0 156.9 438.1 1,057.9 1,450.0 5,179.1 8,282.0 1,815.2 694.7
8/96 116.7 123.7 156.6 438.1 1,057.2 1,453.8 5,167.5 8,273.2 1,811.5 697.5
* in thousands
struction. Recent changes in state and federal tax law should
further boost housing construction, particularly at the low end
of the price range.
The outlook is for more of the same. The Texas Leading
Index jumped in July, signaling continued expansion. The prob-
ability of a Texas recession in 1997 is now less than 2 percent.
Labor market tightness is one factor that could dampen the
forecast. Beige Book contacts continue to report difficulty
finding workers. Average hourly wages are rising at roughly
the rate of inflation for most Texas manufacturing industries
and much faster than inflation for low-wage manufacturing in-
dustries. The September 1 increase in the minimum wage
could widen this gap even further. Still, wages are not rising
as fast in Texas as they are in the rest of the country, so the
state should maintain its competitive edge.
—Lori L. Taylor
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Look for Southwest Economy on the World Wide Web…
http://www.dallasfed.org
Southwest Economy and much of the data
used to produce it are available on FedDallas,
the Dallas Fed home page. This and other
Dallas Fed publications are online in text 
and PDF formats, along with hundreds of
other useful files, such as …
• Banking research and instructions for corporations wishing to file applications 
with the Dallas Fed
• Texas economic data, including the Texas Industrial Production Index and 
Texas Leading Index
• Abstracts of articles from the Center for Latin American Economics
• The Dallas Fed’s exchange rate measure, Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar
• Links to other Federal Reserve sites
• Frequent updates and additions
Best of all, FedDallas E-mail lets Southwest Economy readers comment on articles, critique the site
and suggest future improvements. Stop by soon.